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Abstract 
The influence of capital gains taxes on investment decisions is a central issue of 
accounting and public finance research. However, the implications of capital gains 
taxes on investors' willingness to invest in irreversible projects with entry and exit 
flexibility have not yet been a focal issue. As a result, the effects of taxing capital 
gains on the interdependencies of investment and divestment decisions have to be 
identified, especially under timing flexibility. This paper closes this gap by 
simultaneously analyzing investment timing and abandonment decisions for risky 
irreversible investment projects with uncertain cash flows under differential tax rates 
for ordinary income and capital gains. We investigate whether capital gains taxes 
affect immediate and delayed investment asymmetrically. Furthermore, we 
investigate the impact of capital gains taxation on the optimal abandonment decision. 
Performing extensive numerical simulations we find that varying the liquidation 
proceeds affects the decision whether or not to postpone the investment decision. 
Higher cash flow volatility favors delayed investment. We find that the introduction of 
capital gains taxation tends to be harmful for immediate investment. Moreover, we 
show that taxing capital gains may induce a tax paradox for delayed investment. 
Depending on the pre-tax parameter setting the future value of delayed investment 
may even increase in absolute terms for increasing capital gains tax rates. For 
sufficiently high liquidation proceeds capital gains taxation tends to favor continuation 
of a project. We find taxing capital gains mainly induces other, but not necessarily 
less arbitrary distortions than exempting capital gains. 
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1 Introduction 
1 The taxation of capital gains is one of the key features of an income tax system.  
Many jurisdictions, including the U.S., treat capital gains differently from ordinary 
income. Frequent adjustments of capital gains tax rates initiated many empirical 
studies concerning corporate investment and financing policy.
2 Other countries do 
not tax capital gains at all if some preconditions are met. For example, Greece, 
Latvia, Poland, Romania and Switzerland usually refrain from taxing capital gains 
from selling non-business property. E.g., according to the Danish, Dutch, Estonian, 
Bulgarian, Finnish, French, German, Hungarian, Spanish and Swedish tax law, gains 
and losses from the disposal of business property are taxable as ordinary income, 
whereas gains from selling non-business securities will be subject to a flat capital 
gains tax rate
3. In Austria, the Czech Republic, Great Britain, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
and Portugal, private capital gains are tax-exempt if the time spread between 
acquisition and disposal exceeds a specific period of time.
4 Even countries with tax 
systems close to theoretically ideal tax systems like the nordic Dual Income Tax have 
developed a variety of capital gains tax regimes.
5 Currently, the introduction of a tax 
on (non-speculative) private capital gains is still hotly debated in several countries, 
e.g. in Austria. 
The heterogeneity of capital gains taxation is reflected by the political tax reform 
discussion, which is often characterized by a lack of economic arguments. This is 
true for the Austrian and the German debate prior to the introduction of the general 
capital gains tax. The influence of taxes on investment decisions has been a central 
issue of accounting and public finance research for many years. Several studies 
analyze whether and in what direction capital gains taxation distorts investment 
decisions. Although real-world investment decisions are typically characterized by 
irreversibility, neither the implications of capital gains taxes on investors' general 
willingness to invest nor on their willingness to invest in irreversible projects nor in 
projects with entry and exit flexibility have been a focal issue until now. In the light of 
irreversibility, flexibility with respect to investment and abandonment timing should be 
optimally used in order to avoid a waste of resources. Flexibility under irreversibility is 
analyzed in the real options literature. 
                                                 
1  For a comprehensive overview see Zodrow (1993). 
2  See, e.g., Lang/Shackelford (2000); Shackelford/Verrechia (2002); Blouin/Raedy/Shackelford 
(2003); Ayers/Lefanowicz/Robinson (2003); Keuschnigg/Nielsen (2004). Further, see section 2. 
3  In Italy and the Netherlands capital gains from selling stocks are only subject to capital gains tax if 
the shareholder holds a substantial share in the corporation. In Denmark the capital gains tax rate 
depends on the capital gains tax base. In Germany a flat tax on dividends and capital gains will be 
effective beginning in 2009. 
4  This period varies between six months in Luxembourg and five years under specific conditions in 
the Czech Republik. In most countries there are special rules for real estate. Great Britain provides 
a limited, i.e. partial, tax-exemption of capital gains depending on the holding period. 
5 See, e.g., Nielsen/Sørensen (1997); Boadway (2004); Lindhe/Södersten/Öberg (2004); 
Sørensen (2005) and Kanniainen/Kari/Ylä-Liedenpohja (2007). 
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The impact of ordinary taxation on irreversible investment has been extensively 
analyzed. Although the effects of capital gains taxes on investment and 
abandonment timing are well-known to be important determinants of a project's 
profitability, the interdependencies of capital gains taxes, investment and divestment 
decisions have not yet been identified, especially under timing flexibility. This paper 
closes this gap by simultaneously analyzing investment timing and abandonment 
decisions for risky investment projects under differential tax rates for ordinary income 
and capital gains. 
Our model addresses three major issues arising in the context of capital gains 
taxation. Firstly, the impact of introducing capital gains taxes on real compared to 
financial investment is a traditional research question in capital budgeting. Secondly, 
we analyze the effects of taxing capital gains on investment timing by introducing an 
option to invest in case of risky investment opportunities. This means that the 
investor has the opportunity to choose between immediate and delayed investment. 
We investigate whether capital gains taxes affect immediate and delayed investment 
asymmetrically. Thirdly, our model includes an option to abandon a risky project 
realized in the past. Thus, the investor chooses between liquidating and continuing a 
project. We analyze the impact of capital gains taxation on the optimal abandonment 
decision. Until now, there is no analytical model, which comprises the tax effects 
under simultaneous investment timing and abandonment flexibility. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: After a brief review of the 
literature in section 2 we present the investment model in the pre-tax case and derive 
rules for optimal investment and abandonment decisions in section 3. Since the 
model leaves only limited room for analytical solutions, numerical examples in the 
pre-tax case are discussed extensively in section 4. In section 5, we introduce the tax 
system, including several different tax rates, and solve the resulting investment 
problem. We analyze the economic effects of introducing capital gains taxes 
numerically in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
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2 Literature  review 
The influence of taxes on investment decisions has been analyzed by accounting 
researchers and public economics for many years. Several studies focused on the 
economic effects of individual and corporate income taxation, but neglected real-
world characteristics of tax systems like capital gains taxation
6. 
Under certainty a vast body of theoretical analyses shows that asymmetric taxation of 
current operating profits (or dividends) and capital gains may invoke severe 
distortions. E.g., Holt/Shelton (1961) analyze the impact of the capital gains tax on 
individual investment decisions. Stiglitz (1969) investigates the effects of capital 
gains taxes on the demand for risky assets. Pye (1972) shows that preferential 
capital gains taxation influences optimal dividend policy. Balcer (1983) integrates 
capital gains taxes and taxes on dividends and thereby derives a neutral tax rule. 
Seastrand (1988) investigates whether taxpayers respond to changes in state tax 
rates as well as federal tax rates when realizing capital gains. Auerbach (1989, 1991) 
discusses the distortions associated with capital gains taxes, and proposes a capital 
gains tax system that eliminates the incentive to defer the realization of capital gains 
which does not require unobservable knowledge. Bradford (1996) extends this work 
with respect to financial instruments. Scholz (1988) analyzes how changes in relative 
tax treatment of dividends and capital gains influence investor behavior and shows 
that the dividend clientele effect is significantly reasonable. Klein (1999, 2001) and 
Viard (2000) extend the framework with respect to uncertainty and demonstrate that 
the disincentive to sell an investment project increases with shareholders' capital 
gains tax exposure. 
Haugen/Wichern (1973) investigate the effect of the capital gains tax on the stability 
of stock prices using a simulation. Meade (1990) analyzes the impact of capital gains 
taxes on private investment in an experimental study. Auerbach (1992) studies 
analytically and by simulation the distortive effects of capital gains tax reforms on 
investment decisions. Dempsey (1998) observes that high nominal levels of capital 
gains tax may work to increase the volatility of equity share ownership, destabilise 
share prices, and distort the viability of firms as on-going concerns. 
Sureth/Langeleh (2007) investigate the influence of different systems of corporate 
                                                 
6  Neutral tax systems as a reference concept for analyzing tax effects have been proved under 
certainty by Brown (1948); Samuelson (1964) and Johansson (1969). Furthermore, cf. 
Hartman (1978); Boadway/Bruce (1984); Fane (1987) and Bond/Devereux (1995). 
MacKie-Mason (1990) models nonlinear tax effects under uncertainty and demonstrates that policy 
may subsidize or discourage individual investment depending on the tax system. Under 
uncertainty, enriching the real option literature by integrating taxation (e.g., Harchaoui and Lasserre 
(1996); Jou (2000); Pennings (2000); Agliardi (2001); Panteghini (2001, 2004, 2005); 
Niemann/Sureth (2004, 2005); Gries/Prior/Sureth (2007), and Koskela/Alvarez (2008)) leads to 
investment rules that consider managerial flexibility, irreversibility and tax effects. Further, under 
specific assumptions it is possible to identify tax systems that are neutral with respect to investment 
decisions. For risk neutral investors, neutral tax systems have already been proved in the real 
option context by Niemann (1999) and Sureth (2002). First results for neutral taxation under risk 
aversion have been presented by Niemann/Sureth (2004).  
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income and capital gains taxation on investors' decisions to either carry out an 
investment in corporate shares or to invest funds on the capital market. Applying a 
growth model and performing a Monte Carlo Simulation they find that a full 
imputation system may cause more severe distortions than shareholder relief 
systems, and a dominating impact of capital gains taxation. Ehling et al. (2008) study 
the consumption-portfolio problem with capital gains taxation and its implications for 
trading strategies under limited loss offset. 
Furthermore, empirical studies for different countries, industries, and tax reforms 
provide evidence on the effects of capital gains taxes on asset pricing and 
entrepreneurial decisions. E.g., Cook/O'Hare (1992) and Liang/Matsunaga/ 
Morse (2002) study the effects on the holding period of capital assets caused by 
change in the tax rate on capital gains. They find that the expected holding period is 
a significant variable in explaining the market reaction to a change in capital gains tax 
rate.  Burman/Clausing/O'Hare (1994) and  Burman/Randolphs (1994) investigate 
taxpayer behavior in response to transitory tax changes. They find evidence that 
responses to capital gains tax reform are dramatic and indicate that the elasticity of 
response of taxpayers to transitory variations in capital gains tax is greater than the 
response to permanent variations. In an event study, Jang (1994) revealed that, 
during legislative transition period in the U.S., high yield stocks generally earned 
positive abnormal returns and low yield stocks earned negative returns. 
The capital gains lock-in effect is subject of an empirical study by 
Landsman/Shackelford (1995).  Guenther/Willenborg (1999) and Downer (2001) 
examine the impact of capital gains taxation on investment decisions of small and 
medium sized enterprises and find that a reduction in capital gains tax encourages 
investment. Feldstein/Yitzhaki (1978), Feldstein/Slemrod/Yitzhaki (1980) present sets 
of econometric estimates of the effect of capital gains tax on the selling of common 
stock indicating that there is a substantial effect. Gordon/Bradford (1980) measure 
the relative valuation of dividends and capital gains in the stock market, using a 
variant of the capital asset pricing model. 
Slemrod (1982) shows that the abnormal year-end behavior on the stock market is 
driven by tax reasons. Seida/Wempe (2000) examine individual investors' short- and 
long-term trading reaction to a capital gains tax rate increase. Wu/Hsu (1996), 
Reese (1998),  Lang/Shackelford (2000),  Shackelford (2000) and Akindayomi/ 
Warsame (2007) empirically derive the extent to which stock prices react to cuts in 
the capital gains tax rate. Shackelford/Verrecchia (2002) and  Blouin/Raedy/ 
Shackelford (2003) show that capital gains taxes induce investors to defer selling 
appreciated stock and may dampen trading volume and amplify price changes 
around the time of public disclosures. Ayers/Lefanowicz/Robinson (2003) test 
empirically whether capital gains taxes affect premiums paid on corporate 
acquisitions. Their evidence suggests that shareholder-level taxes have a significant 
price effect on acquisitions which varies with the tax status of the target's 
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shareholder. Keuschnigg/Nielsen (2004) empirically analyze the influence of capital 
gains taxes on start-up finance with double moral hazard. Edmiston (2004) estimates 
tax volatility in a cross-country investigation and provides a panel regression 
suggesting that the volatility of effective tax rates on capital income has a significant 
negative impact on investment. Corresponding to the findings of Poterba (1989a, 
1989b), they point out that capital gains taxes particularly discourage entrepreneurial 
efforts. Sinai/Gyourko (2004) investigate the effect of a capital gains tax reduction on 
the share prices of real estate firms while Dhaliwal/Erickson/Heitzman (2004) do the 
same for acquisition prices. Blouin/Hail/Yetman (2005), Cook (2006) and 
Dai et al. (2006) examine empirically the response of equity values to the 
announcement of a decrease in the capital gains tax rate. 
The interdependencies of profit taxation and capital gains taxation may influence the 
timing and profitability of investment under divestment flexibility. These issues have 
not been simultaneously analyzed in literature yet. It is important to introduce these 
aspects into decision models under uncertainty to identify the impact of capital gains 
taxes on investor's willingness to invest. 
3 Pre-tax  model 
Our model is a discrete-time model with a discrete state space. For simplicity, we 
assume a time horizon of   periods. This is the shortest possible time horizon 
that simultaneously permits to analyze an option to invest and an option to abandon.
=3 T
7 
The model is based on a purely individual calculus. At the starting time  , the 
investor owns initial equity capital  , which corresponds to the acquisition costs 
of a project with stochastic cash flows. Cash flow uncertainty is modeled by a 
geometric binomial process. At any time t the project's cash flow denoted by   








1 with probability 1
with 0 1
+







 ud , t ,, T .
  p  (1) 
The publicly observable initial value is given by  . The upward probability  0 π p  is the 
investor's subjective probability. The upward and downward movements u  and d  
are also individual estimations by the investor. The investment project is regarded as 
an innovative combination of numerous single assets. The spanning property does 
not hold.
8 As a result, the completed project yields cash flows that cannot be 
                                                 
7  Our model is in line with the Dixit/Pindyck (1994) model who use a continuous-time approach with 
an infinite time horizon. Since our objective is to identify the effects of capital gains taxation on 
investment and abandonment decisions, we need a discrete-time model with a finite time horizon. 
8  See e.g. Dixit/Pindyck (1994), pp. 147 ff., Trigeorgis (1996), p. 72 ff. 
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duplicated by traded assets. The project's resulting cash flows are not related to the 
sum of the acquisition costs or liquidation proceeds of the single assets. Therefore, 
the investor has to assess the entire project individually and cannot refer to market 
tor h opti
t  not y 
values. 
The inves as an  on to delay. This means that there is flexibility to invest either 
in period  =0 t  or in  =1 t . The date of investmen is de ed b I t . The earliest cash 
flows accrue one period after investment, i.e.  1 π  in  =1 t  or  2 π  in  =2 t . The initial 
outlay necessary to acquire the investment project is constant and given by  0 I . In 
principle, the acquisition costs could be modeled as deterministic or stochastic 
functions. For reasons of analytical simplicity, we focus on a constant  0 I .
9 If the 
investor does not invest immediately in  =0 t  he does not r ceive the cash flo 1. In 
this case, the equity capital yields the risk-free return r . Then, at time  =1 t  the 
investor faces the decision to invest again. If he decides to invest, he receives the 
remaining cash flows until the time horizon or the liquidation date is reached. 
the exogenously-given interest rate r  until 
= tT . Apart fro
e w
m , the interest rate 
ash
ssets the investment project is composed of. The 
Su arizi
•  No -or-later decision to invest immediately or to postpone the decision 
•  the business or to abandon the project 
represented by numbered rectangles (11, 21, 22, 31,..., 38). Event nodes, i.e. upward 
                                                
 π
Otherwise, his wealth is compounded at 
0  π r  is the only parameter, which is determined 
by the market. 
If the investor decides to carry out the project in  =0 t  or  =1 t  he also obtains an 
option to abandon the project prematurely in  =2 t . Without exercising the option to 
abandon the investor would receive c  flows until the time horizon  3 tT == . In 
contrast, if the option is exercised in  2 t , the investor abandons the entire project 
and receives the liquidation proceeds  2 L , but no cash flows  3 π .  2 L  is an individual 
estimation by the investor and is not endogenously derived in the model. The 
liquidation proceeds can be interpreted as a lower bound for the sum of the single 
liquidation proceeds of the a
=
liquidation date is denoted by  L t . 
mm ng, the investor faces different decisions at three points of time: 
=0 t :  w
=1 t   until 
•  : Now-or-never decision to invest or to quit the market 
2 t = : Now-or-later decision to continue 
1 t =
(only if the project was implemented in  0 t =  or in  1 t = ) 
Graphically, the decision tree is displayed in fig. 1. Here, decision nodes are 
 
0 I 9  The investment rule for an   following a geometric Brownian motion is very similar to the 
investment rule for constant acquisition costs. See Dixit/Pindyck (1994), pp. 207 ff. 
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and downward movements of the cash flow process, are symbolized by dots. The 
capital letter L indicates a liquidation decision by the investor. 
 
Fig. 1:  Structure of decisions and events in the model. 
The investor's objective variable is the future value at the time horizon T , denoted by 
. Although the investor can decide to abandon the project at time  , a uniform 
time horizon is needed to compare the optimality of different decisions. We assume 
that the investor's consumption is financed by exogenous income from other sources. 
Hence, withdrawals are not necessary. 
T FV 2 t =
The investment/liquidation problem can be solved by backward induction, i.e. the 
decision to abandon (decision nodes 31-38 in fig. 1) has to be solved first. Each 
decision node corresponds to a particular combination of upward movements (u ) 
and downward movements ( ). If the project is in place, the investor observes the 
current cash flow   that is characterized by three possible realizations
d
10






















π= π=+ + π
π=+ π
 (2) 
For each of the possible realizations the optimal abandonment decision has to be 
reached. For the decision to abandon, decision nodes 31 and 35, both characterized 
by  , require identical optimal decisions. The same holds for nodes 32 and 36  uu
                                                 
10 Superscripts 
u and 
d denote the current number of upward and downward movements of the cash 
flow process. 
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( ), 33 and 37 ( ), 34 and 38 ( ). This implies that the optimal liquidation 
decision does not depend on the time of investment in the pre-tax case. 
ud du dd
We assume risk neutrality. The project will be liquidated in   only if the 
compounded liquidation proceeds exceed the expected future value from the 
project's remaining cash flows
2 t =
11: 
[ ]   () () ) () 22 3 2 2 11 1 1 r L E p   u p  d   q . +> π = π + −+ = π ( + ⎡ ⎣⎤ ⎦  (3) 
This means that liquidation is optimal if the liquidation proceeds divided by the 
current cash flow exceed the expected discounted value of the next cash flow 
movement: 















For ease of notation we use the abbreviation  . Obviously, 
higher liquidation proceeds  , lower current cash flows  , higher interest yield r , 
lower upward probability 
() () ( 111 qp u p d =+ + − +
2 π 2 L
p , and lower upward movements   increase the likelihood 
of liquidation. 
u
The remaining objective value at the decision nodes 31-38 is defined as the 
maximum of the compounded liquidation proceeds and the expected future cash 
flows from continuing the project
12: 
() [ ] () {} 22 2 3 2 2 } max{ 1 }
xx
T E F V r L;E r L; q, x u ,d .




 describes the cash flows from current operations or liquidation proceeds in 
 after upward or downward movements denoted by xx. Moving backwards, we 
arrive at time   (decision nodes 21 (u ) and 22 (d ), respectively). Assuming that 
the investor has not invested in period  , he faces the decision between the 
deterministic future value from financial investment 
1 t =
t 0 =
fin F T V  and the uncertain future 
value of the project's remaining cash flows  . The future value from financial 
investment as the default alternative is simply the initial wealth compounded at the 






T0 FV r r . =+ =+
3
                                                
1 I  (6) 
 
[ ] t E ⋅  indicate the time of taking the expectation. 
11 Subscripts  t in the expectations operator 
12 Superscripts 
∗
 indicate optimal decisions. 
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The investor realizes the project at date   if its expected future value exceeds the 
future value of financial investment: 
1 t =
[ ] 1 1
fin
T tI F V
= > T
1 T
EF V . The value of the project is 
defined as the future value of the remaining cash flows, taking the option to abandon 




11 2 1 2 1 1
xx
T tI E FV r E E E FV r r .
∗
=
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ π+ + + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  (7) 
To reach a decision in  , the upward and the downward cases have to be 
distinguished. The current cash flow is either   or  . In the 
upward case, the project value is given by: 
1 t =
() 10 1
u u π= + π () 10 1
d d π= + π
() ()
() () () () ()
() () () () {}









11 1 1 1
11 m a x 1 1







EF V p r u EF V
p rud E F Vr r
ruq p r L ; uq




⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + π + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ +− + + + π + + + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
=+ + π + + + π
+− + + + π + +
 (8) 
In the downward case, the future value of investing is: 
() () ()
() () () ()
() () () () () {}









11 m a x 1 11






EF V p r u d EF V
pr dE F V r r
rdq p r L ; udq




⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + + π + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ +− + + π + + + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
=+ + π + + + + π
+− + + π + +
 (9) 
As a crucial result, the optimal investment decision involves the anticipation of the 
optimal abandonment decision. 
The remaining objective value at the decision nodes in  , 21 (u ) and 22 ( ), 
given the optimal investment decision, is defined as the maximum of the possible 
future values: 















EF V r, EF V





⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
1 t I =
 (10) 
Moving further backwards to the initial decision node 11, the investor faces the 
decision whether or not to delay investment. From (10), it can be easily seen that the 
ex ante value of delayed investment is defined as: 
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[ ] () 01 1 1 11
1
u
TT t tt I II
EF V p EF V p EF V
∗∗
= ==
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
d
T .  (11) 
If the investor invests in t , there is no flexibility at time t . In this case, the 
expected future value is defined as the expected value of the compounded cash 
flows of periods   and the remaining value taking into account the value of the 
option to abandon: 
0 = 1 =
1, 2 t =
[] ()[]()[] [ ]
() ()
() ()
() () () ()
() () ()
2







max{ 1 1 }
21 m a x { 1 1 1 }






I EF V rE r E EEF V
rqrq
pr L ; u q
p pr L ; u d




⎡ ⎤ =+ π ++ π+ ⎣ ⎦
=+ π ++ π
++ π +
+− + π + +
+− + π +
 (12) 
This value of investing immediately is compared to the optimal expected future value 
if the investor decides to wait until  . The project is realized in   if its expected 
future value exceeds the expected future value from delayed investment: 
1 t = 0 t =
[ ] [ ] 00 0 T t II EF V EF V .
= >
1 T t =  (13) 
As a result, the expected future value of the project taking into account optimal 
exercise of all options is defined as the maximum of both values: 
[] [] [] { } 00 0 0 max
∗
= = TT t I E FV E FV ; E FV .
1 = T t I  (14) 
Due to the numerous non-linearities arising from the maximum operations, the 
optimal investment and liquidation policy cannot be immediately observed from the 
derived set of expressions above. Thus, the following questions should be analyzed 
numerically: 
•  Does the level of liquidation proceeds   affect investment timing?  2 L
•  Does the cash flow volatility, represented by the difference u , affect 
investment and liquidation timing? 
d −
•  To what extent does the interest rate   affect investment and liquidation 
policy? 
r
In order to illustrate the economic setting we will firstly investigate these issues in the 
pre-tax case. In sections 5 and 6, we will integrate taxation. 
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4  Numerical examples in the pre-tax case 
To illustrate the impact of the different parameters on the investment and 
abandonment decisions we start with a symmetric scenario described by 
1
2 p ;u d == − . In this case the expectation   simplifies to  . The remaining 
parameters   will be varied. 
q 1 q =
2 L,r ,π0
Fig. 2 illustrates the investor's timing problem. The independent variable is defined by 
the liquidation proceeds  . The figure consists of four different value functions 
determining the optimal investment behavior. The thick solid line represents the 
future value 
2 L
[ ] 0 0 T tI EF V
=  of investing immediately. Obviously, it increases with 
increasing liquidation proceeds. The kinks of the value function indicate switches of 
the optimal liquidation policy depending on the liquidation proceeds. The future value 






 is given by the thin dotted line. It does not depend on 
the liquidation proceeds  . The dashed lines indicate the future values of two 
differently defined types of delayed real investment. The thin dashed line displays the 
future value of real investment carried out definitely in  , regardless of the cash 






p E FV p E FV
==
⎡ ⎤⎡ +− ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ . 
It does not reflect the investor's flexibility to refrain from real investment by opting for 
financial investment in t . However, it could be used to analyze tax effects   
on delayed real investment rather than a mixture of real and financial   
investment. The thick dashed line represents the value function 
1 =
[ ] () 1 1 1
u
t tt I II
EF V p EF V
= ⎡ − ⎣
1 π






∗ =+ . This function is the actual value 
function of delayed investment as defined in (11), taking into account the opportunity 
to choose between real and financial investment at time   after having observed 
. For 
1 t =
[ ] 1 T tI V
= 0 EF  the following relations hold: 
[] () { }
[] () {}
01 1 1 11




TT T T t tt
fin u d
TT T T t tt
I II
I II
E FV FV , p E FV p E FV L
L E FV FV , p E FV p E FV .
= ==
= ==
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ≥+ − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ∃> + − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
2 ∀
 (15) 
Fig. 2 is based on the parameter setting  :  0 0.1 0.2 0.375 r, u d, == − = π =
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expected future value of delayed real investment with opportunity to optfor  financial 
investment in t=1
expected future value of delayed real investment without opportunity to opt for  financial 
investment in t=1 
expected future value of immediate real investment
future value of financial investment
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=
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Fig. 2:  Future values 
1 t I =  as functions of the 
liquidation proceeds  . 
For ease of presentation and to focus on the decision aspects of capital gains 
taxation, for delayed investment only the value function  [ ] 0 1 T tI EF V
= , i.e., a scenario 
considering the opportunity to switch from the real to a financial investment in  , is 
displayed in the following figures. 
1 t =
The parameter setting   yields the following future values for 
financial investment 
0 0.2 0.2 ud ; =− = π =
fin
T [ ] 0 0 T tI EF V
= FV  (thin dotted line), for immediate investment   
(solid line), and for delayed investment  [ ] 1 T tI V
= 0 EF  (dashed line), depending on the 
liquidation proceeds  [ ] 2 0, 1.5 ∈ L . The interest rates are   (left graph) and 
, respectively (right graph). 
0.1 r =
0.3 r =
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Fig. 3:  Future values 
1 t I =  as functions of the 
liquidation proceeds  . 
Obviously, it depends on the parameter setting whether immediate (left graph) or 
delayed investment is optimal (right graph). The level of liquidation proceeds   
affects optimal investment policy, as can be observed from the intersections of 
2 L
[ ] 0 1 T tI EF V









/ , and  / , respectively. For low values of   
financial investment is optimal. Here, real investment is non-optimal for   as well 
as for  . For sufficiently high levels of   (  in the left graph), immediate 
investment is optimal. Delayed investment (t ) never maximizes the investor's 
future value for  . Whereas for  , delayed real investment dominates 
immediate investment for all values of   and financial investment for  . 
2 L
0 I t =
1.06 >
1 I t = 2 0.79 L >
1 I =
2
0.3 r 0.1 =
2 L
The future value of immediate investment is a piecewise linear function of the 
liquidation proceeds  . The kinks of the graphs indicate the critical values of   for 
which the optimal liquidation policy changes. As can be seen from (4), the number of 
critical values ( ) corresponds to the number of different states at the possible 
liquidation date  . Given that the real investment project is in place, the optimal 
liquidation policy does not depend on investment timing. Thus, the critical values are 
identical for immediate and delayed investment in the pre-tax case as shown in 
equation (4). 
2 L 2 L
3 =
2 t =
Investment timing is substantially affected by variations of the interest rate   as can 
be seen from the following figure, which depicts the future values of financial 
investment 
r
[ ] 0 0 T tI EF V
=
fin
T FV  (dotted line), immediate real investment   (solid line), 
and delayed investment  [ ] 0 1 T tI EF V
=  (dashed line) as functions of the liquidation 
proceeds  . The parameters are  .  2 L 20 1.25 0.2 L, u d , == − = 0.375 π =
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expected future value of delayed real investment
expected future value of immediate real investment
future value of financial investment
 
Fig. 4:  Future values  [ ] [ ] 00 0
fin
TT T t I FV , E FV , E FV
=
r
1 t I =  as functions of the pre-tax 
interest rate  . 
Consistent with traditional investment theory, real investment is most attractive for 
low interest rates. As delayed investment contains a substantial interest income 
component, waiting becomes more attractive for higher interest rates. For very high 
interest rates, financial investment is optimal. Fig. 4 reveals that each investment 
alternative may be optimal for a particular interval of interest rates. However, there 
exist combinations of parameters, which induce that either immediate or delayed 
investment may be inferior for all possible interest rates. 
Evidently, immediate investment becomes more attractive compared to delayed 
investment for higher values of the initial cash flow  . Since financial investment is 
unaffected by   and there is a point of indifference between immediate and delayed 
investment, financial investment is optimal for very low values of  . Assuming 
sufficiently high liquidation proceeds  , delayed investment is optimal for 
intermediate starting values  , immediate investment is optimal for high levels of the 
initial cash flow. These relations can be observed from the following figure assuming 








1.5 2 L = 2 L 0.1 =
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Fig. 5:  Future values 
fin
T FV, [ ] 0 0 T tI EF V
= , [ ] 0 1 T tI EF V
=      as functions of the initial 
observable cash flow  .  0 π
Fig. 5 illustrates that if   does not reach a critical value, delayed investment may 
never be optimal, regardless of   (right graph). Very high liquidation proceeds may 
even compensate for negative operating cash flows.  
2 L
0 π
As in the preceding figures, dotted lines represent the future value of financial 
investment  [ ] 0 0 T tI EF V
=
fin
T FV , solid lines the future value of immediate investment  , 
and dashed lines the future value of delayed investment  [ ] 0 1 T tI EF V
= . 
Varying the volatility of cash flows reveals that the future values of real investment 
are convex with respect to the difference  . Fig. 6 shows that for symmetric 
upward and downward movements ( ) the future values are increasing in  . 
The underlying set of parameters is  . The interest rates are 
 (left graph) and   (right graph), respectively. This finding is consistent 
with traditional option pricing theory that says that option prices increase with 
increasing volatility of the underlying asset. In the setting considered here, real 
investment includes the option to abandon, which is more valuable for higher 
differences of   and  . Equation (5) gives the remaining future value at the decision 
nodes 31-38:  . The term () is a lower 
bound, which is identical for each decision node. Since 
ud −
d
2 0.7 L, =π
q } π
u =−














2 1 rL +
() { }
2 2 2
20 + π 0 , π − 0 11 1 u,u u − π π∈ , quadratic terms enter the value functions. In 
the expected value, these terms do not cancel out, because the maximum is 
computed separately at each decision node before the expectation is taken. 
According to equations (8), (9), (10), and (11), the computation of the future value of 
delayed investment  [ ] 1 T tI EF V
=  involves a nested maximum operation, which tends  0
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to increase the coefficient of   in the value function compared to immediate 
investment. Hence, the slope of 
2 u
[ ] 0 0 T tI EF V
= [ ] 0 1 T tI EF V
=  exceeds the slope of   for 
sufficiently high values of u . This effect favors delayed investment as can be inferred 
from the right part of fig. 6. 
FV
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Fig. 6:  Future values  [ ] [ ] 00 0
fin
TT T t I FV , E FV , E FV
=
() 2 ud / −
1 t I =
d
 as functions of the upward 
movement  . 
For asymmetric upward and downward movements ( ) the future values are 
not necessarily increasing in  . 
u ≠−
u
Summarizing, the interrelation of the economic variables in the pre-tax case is quite 
straightforward. The following sections discuss whether this property is maintained 
after the integration of taxes or whether taxation – particularly capital gains taxation – 
induces severe distortions of investment timing and liquidation decisions. 
5 Integrating  Taxation 
To isolate the impact of a capital gains tax, we assume that capital gains are subject 
to the tax rate 
g τ , which may differ from the tax rate on ordinary (operating) income 
. Moreover, interest income is taxed at the rate  . For simplicity, all tax rates are 
assumed proportional. We neglect loss-offset limitations, which would further 
complicate the analysis. If a tax base is negative, the taxpayer receives a tax 
reimbursement of  . 
o τ
i τ
() tax rate tax base ⋅






13  : 
                                                 
13  For simplicity, we do not take other depreciation schedules like declining balance depreciation into 
account. 
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1 o
tt t t b
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=π −δ =π − .  (16) 
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tt t t b
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τ τ
π= π− τ = − τ π+ .  (18) 
The project's useful life for tax purposes is given by  . Since the time horizon is 
also defined as  , a delayed project realized at time   still has a positive book 
value at time t . The same happens if a project acquired at   or   is 
abandoned in  . The taxable capital gain 
3 T =




0 t = 1 t =
g
t b  is the difference of liquidation 









=− −δ ⎜ ⎜









  if t
b




This implies that the project's book value, the depreciation deductions, and a possible 
capital gain are path-dependent and contingent on the time of investment. In contrast 
to the pre-tax case, the decision nodes 31 and 35 ( ) (and 32/36 (ud ), 33/37 




In line with the pre-tax case the investment-liquidation problem has to be solved 
using backward induction. Since the taxation of ordinary income and capital gains 
may differ, the investor distinguishes between the different possible dates of 
investment. If the project was realized in  , the book value   at time   is 
given by 
0 I t = 2 BV 2 t =
- K 18 - Niemann / Sureth: Investment effects of capital gains taxation 
20 1 2 0
1
3 tI BVI
= =− δ − δ = .  (21) 
In case of liquidation, the resulting capital gain or capital loss 




t t t I I
bL B VL
= =
=− =−  (22) 
g τ . The resulting net-of-tax liquidation proceeds  is taxed at the capital gains tax rate 
2 L
τ  are given by: 










τ ⎛⎞ = −τ = −τ − = −τ + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.  (23) 
If the investor decides to continue the project, a capital gain or loss does not occur at 
date  , because the project's remaining value and its book value are both 
equal to zero. The expected future value after taxes at date   can be computed 




() () () ()
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⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎡⎤=+ π − τ + τ δ + − + π − τ + τ δ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣







The investor abandons the project if the after-tax liquidation proceeds, compounded 
at the after-tax interest rate  , exceed the expected after-tax future value 




() () ( ) ()
() () () ()
22 2 3 0
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⎡⎤ ττ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ += + − τ − τ + > π = − τ π ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ +− τ − − τ π > δ τ − + τ ⎣⎦
+
(25) 
Obviously, the condition for optimal abandonment is not as simple as in the pre-tax 
case (4). However, (25) permits to derive a critical capital gains tax rate at which the 

























−τ π + − +
τ=
+−
2 L  (26) 
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It should be noted that all three (possibly different) tax rates  , 
i τ
g τ , and   as well as 




If the project was acquired in period  , it has been depreciated for only one period 
in  . Thus, the book value differs from (21) and amounts to 
1 t =
2
20 2 3 1 tI BV I
= =− δ = 2 t = . 
The resulting capital gain 
g τ 2
22 =− 2 3 1 1
g
t t t I I
B VL
= =
=− bL  is taxed at the rate  , so that 
the after-tax liquidation proceeds are given by: 




2 g gg g
t tt II
LL bLL - L
τ
==
⎛⎞ =− τ =− τ = − τ + τ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
g .  (27) 
If the investor decides to operate the project until the time horizon T , it still has a 
positive book value  1
3 3 1 tI BV
= = , because it was depreciated for only two periods. 
Assuming that the liquidation proceeds in   equal zero, the investor realizes a 
capital loss that entitles to a tax reimbursement at the capital gains tax rate 
3 tT ==
g τ . Note 
that real-world tax systems may be characterized by different tax rates for sale and 
liquidation proceeds. This implies that taxpayers minimize their tax burden by 
arranging facts determining the tax base. These tax planning strategies are reflected 
by the optimization calculus in our model
14. Thus, the after-tax liquidation proceeds at 











g .  (28) 
This term has to be added to the operating cash flows in   if the optimal 
liquidation decision is considered. Liquidation in   is optimal if the compounded 
after-tax liquidation proceeds exceed the expected after-tax operating cash flows in 
 and the tax reimbursement from the capital loss in  : 
3 t =
2 t =
3 t = tT =
() () () ()














rL r L E F V q




ττ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ += + − τ + τ > = − τ π + ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ +− τ − − τ π > τ − + τ ⎣⎦
2 3
+
                                                
(29) 
 
14  Although sale and liquidation are very much related tax systems often provide different tax rates for 
these different ways to quit an investment. Integrating different tax rates in a decision model can 
extremely complicate the calculus. See, e.g., Hundsdoerfer/Kruschwitz/Lorenz (2008) who show 
how the investment decision and the finance decisions can be optimized simultaneously. Based on 
simple premises they evaluate an indivisible investment project that is carried out in a corporation 
and find the decision problem turns out to be rather complex if different tax rates have to be 
considered. 
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The optimal liquidation decision depends on all tax rates  , 
i τ
g τ , and  , the interest 
rate  , as well as the date of investment 
o τ
I t r . The critical capital gains tax rate at 

























−τ π + − +
τ=
+− +
2 L  (30) 
This critical capital gains tax rate falls short of the critical tax rate for immediate 
investment, as can be seen from (26). Consequently, continuation is more likely for 
delayed investment than for immediate investment. 
The investor's remaining objective value at the decision nodes 31-34 (immediate 
investment) is defined as the maximum of the compounded after-tax liquidation 
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For delayed investment (decision nodes 35-38), the remaining objective value is 
given by: 
() () () 22 1
2





EF V r L q
∗τ τ
=





For positive tax rates,  . Hence, this tax system tends to 
delay investment. 
22 10 T tt II
EF V EF V
∗τ ∗τ
==
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ > ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
Moving backwards to time  , we arrive at decision nodes 21 ( ) and 22 ( ), 
respectively. The future value from financial investment 
1 t = d u
fin,
T FV
τ is simply the initial 






T FVr I r
ττ ⎡ =+ =+ − τ ⎣ . ⎤
⎦  (33) 
This value is compared to the expected future value of investing in  , which 
consists of the compounded expected after-tax cash flow from period  , the 
operating cash flow from period  , taking into account the option to abandon, and 
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() ()
2
11 2 1 2 11
1 TT tt II
EF V r E EEF V r r .
ττ τ ∗ τ τ
==
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ π+ + + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
1
τ  (34) 
The investor acquires the project in period   if its expected future value exceeds 





EF V F V
τ
=




Again, the upward state ( ) and the downward state ( ) 
have to be distinguished. In the upward state, the investor can reach the following 
expected future value after taxes from investing: 




























































⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ − τ+ π + τ δ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ +− τ + τ ⎣⎦ ⎪⎪ + ⎨⎬
⎪⎪ −τ + π + + ⎩⎭
⎡ ⎤ +− + − τ + + π + τ δ ⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫ ⎡⎤ +− τ + τ ⎣⎦ ⎪ ⎪ +− ⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ −τ + + π + + ⎩⎭
++
 (36) 
The corresponding expected future value after taxes in the downward state is given 
by: 
() () () ()
() ()
() () ()




















































⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ − τ+ + π + τ δ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
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⎦  (37) 
The remaining objective value is defined as the maximum of the future values of real 
and financial investment: 
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⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
 (38) 
The decision whether or not to delay investment is addressed in decision node 11 
( ). The expected value of delayed investment can be written as:  t0 =
() 01 1 11
1
u, d,
TT T tt II
EF V p EF V pEF V
τ∗ τ ∗ τ
==





The expected future value of investing immediately is defined as the sum of the 
compounded operating cash flows of periods   and the remaining objective 
value in the decision nodes 31-38: 
1, 2 t =
() () 00 1 0 2 0 0
11
2
T2 t0 t II
EF V r E r E EEF V
ττ τ τ τ ∗ τ
= =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ π++ π+ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 (40) 
[ ] [ ] 00 0 T t I EF V EF V
= > Immediate investment is optimal if 
1 T t I = . Again, the investor's 
initial expected objective value is the maximum of both terms: 
{ } 00 0 0
max ; TT T tt II
EF V EF V EF V
∗τ τ τ
==
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ 1
.  (41) 
6  Numerical examples in the after-tax case 
Since the optimal investment timing and abandonment decisions after the integration 
of taxes are more complex and require more case differentiations than in the pre-tax 
model, analytical solutions are even more unlikely. Consequently, we focus on 
numerical simulations to elaborate the effects of (capital gains) taxation. The 
following examples illustrate the impact of introducing and varying the capital gains 
taxation on entrepreneurial investment and liquidation policy. Again, we focus on a 
symmetric distribution of upward and downward movements of the cash flow process 
( 1
2 p ,u d == − ). 
The first example illustrates the impact of varying the pre-tax liquidation proceeds   
on the future values of immediate and delayed investment. Fig. 7 shows that the 
relative advantage of immediate versus delayed investment changes due to the 
introduction of capital gains taxation. Solid lines represent immediate investment, 
dashed lines delayed investment. Thick lines indicate after-tax values, thin lines 
values after ordinary taxation, but prior to capital gains taxation. For the parameter 
setting  ,  ,   (left part of fig. 7), the investor prefers to invest 
immediately without capital gains taxation ( , ), if the liquidation 
2 L
0 0.2 π= 0.2 d = 0.1 r =
g 0 τ= 0.35
io τ= τ=
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proceeds exceed  . If capital gains are taxed, the investor will delay 
investment unless the liquidation proceeds reach at least  . Thus, capital 
gains taxation tends to favor delayed investment. Under this parameter setting, 
delayed real investment is never optimal. If the investor does not invest immediately, 
financial investment is preferred to delayed real investment. 
2 0.625 L =
2 0.625 L =
However, this relation changes for higher pre-tax interest rates, e.g., for  , as 
can be observed from the right part of fig. 7. Immediate investment will never be 
optimal after the introduction of capital gains taxation, because the investor always 
prefers to delay investment. For low values of  , financial investment is optimal, 
whereas delayed real investment maximizes the investor's future value for sufficiently 
high liquidation proceeds. Again, taxing capital gains favors delayed investment. 
0.3 r =
2 L









expected after-tax future value of delayed real investment with capital gains tax
expected after-tax future value of immediate real investment with capital gains tax
expected after-tax future value of delayed real investment with tax- exempt capital gains
expected after-tax future value of immediate real investment with tax-exempt capital 
gains











expected after-tax future va  with capital gains tax
expected after-tax future va nt with capital gains tax
expected after-tax future va  with tax- exempt capital gains
expected after-tax future va ent with tax-exempt capital 
gains
future value of financial inve
lue of delayed real investment
lue of immediate real investme
lue of delayed real investment






Fig. 7:   Future values   as functions of the liquidation 
proceeds  . 
00 01
, T tt II
EF V EF V
τ
==
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
2 L
1
2 3 = L 2
2 3 = L For   (immediate investment) and   (delayed investment), the taxable 
capital gain equals zero. The advantage of delayed investment under a capital gains 
tax is straightforward: The book value of assets to be offset against the constant 
liquidation proceeds   in   equals  2 L 2 t = 1
2 3 0 tI BV
= =  in case of immediate investment 
and  2
2 3 1 tI BV













= - -  exceeds the capital gain from delayed investment  . 
Consequently, immediate investment benefits to a higher extent from tax-exempt 
capital gains than delayed investment. 
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Varying the pre-tax interest rate   induces similar results as in the pre-tax case. For 
sufficiently low interest rates, immediate investment is optimal. If   exceeds a critical 
value, delayed real investment becomes beneficial. For sufficiently high interest 
rates, delaying investment and realizing financial investment in   is the optimal 
alternative. Again, capital gains taxation favors delayed investment compared to 
immediate investment for positive capital gains. This effect is exemplified in fig. 8 for 
the parameter setting  . The 
critical interest rate above which it is optimal to delay investment is   for 
, whereas it is   if capital gains are taxed at the rate  . These 
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Fig. 8:   Future values   as functions of the pre-tax interest 
rate  . 
00 01
, T tt II
EF V EF V
τ
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⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ T
τ
r
Financial investment is never subject to capital gains taxation in our model. Thus, 
taxing capital gains tends to make real investment less attractive. The optimal switch 
from delayed real investment to financial investment depending on the pre-tax 
interest rate cannot be directly observed from fig. 8. It depends on the state of the 
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cash flow process in  . Assuming an upward movement ( ), the investor 
never carries out real investment for   if capital gains are tax-exempt. For 
, this critical threshold decreases to   implying that real investment 
becomes less likely to be realized. Correspondingly, the critical interest rate for a 
downward movement in   (π= ) declines from r  to  , if the 
capital gains tax rate is increased from   to  . As a result, immediate as 













g τ= 0.7 =
g τ=
1 π 1 = 0. = 0.55 =
0.35
Varying the volatility of cash flows, measured by the difference of upward and 
downward movement  , yields the following future values as displayed in fig. 9, 
based on the parameter setting 
ud −
20 0.7, 0.1, , 0.375, 0.35
gio Lr u d === − π = τ = τ = τ = : 
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Fig. 9:  Future values  ⎦  as functions of the 
upward movement  . 
Since the upward and downward movements are symmetric ( ,  ud =−
1
2 p= ) the 
future values of real investment increase with increasing u . As can be seen from the 
intersection of the dashed lines, introducing capital gains taxation can increase the 
future value of delayed investment, even for positive capital gains. This paradoxical 
effect will be explained later on. With capital gains taxation, the kinks in the value 
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functions for real investment can be observed for smaller values of u  than without 
capital gains taxation. This effect is straightforward, because taxing capital gains 
penalizes liquidation more heavily than continuing the business. Thus, the critical 
values of u  above which continuation is optimal decrease due to the introduction of 
capital gains taxation. Again, fig. 9 reveals that immediate investment suffers more 
from capital gains taxation than delayed investment, whereas financial investment 
remains unaffected. 
g τ Varying the capital gains tax rate   induces ambiguous results with respect to 
optimal investment behavior. Since the capital gain for immediate investment is 
higher than for delayed real investment, increasing the capital gains tax rate relatively 
favors delayed investment. In special cases, the expected future value of delayed 
investment can even increase with increasing 
g τ . This paradoxical effect is displayed 
in the left part of fig. 10 for the parameter setting 
  . 
As before, solid lines represent immediate investment, dashed lines delayed 
investment, and dotted lines financial investment. 
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Although the capital gain is always positive – the liquidation proceeds   
exceed the book values 
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= =  and  , respectively – the expected 
future value of delayed investment increases with increasing 
g τ . This is due to the 
fact that the second term () 2 33 1
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g
 in the maximum operation of (32) is 
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g τ
15 increasing in   and dominates for very high tax rates ( ). 0.7532
g τ>  It depends on 
the parameter setting under consideration whether this effect occurs in the relevant 
tax rate interval  [ ] 0, 1
g τ∈
0.2, d == − =
. 
For   both immediate and 
delayed investment suffer from increasing capital gains taxes, although delayed 
investment is penalized more heavily. This effect can be seen from the right part of 
fig. 10. 
2 1.25, 0.25, 0.375,
io
0 r = π =τ = Lu
                                                
0.35 τ =
Hence, the optimal investment timing and liquidation decisions strongly depend on 
the capital gains tax rate. Typically, both types of real investment are discriminated 
by capital gains taxation compared to financial investment, but there exist exceptions 
with apparently paradoxical tax effects. 
Summarizing, there is a wide variety of different economic effects due to variations of 
the pre-tax parameters and the capital gains tax rate. 
7 Economic  implications 
We analyze the impact of capital gains taxation on optimal investment timing and 
abandonment policy under uncertain cash flows. A key feature of our model is 
entrepreneurial flexibility and partial irreversibility of investment. These properties of a 
real-world investment environment are modeled simultaneously by an option to invest 
and an option to abandon. Thus, an investor has the opportunity to choose between 
either investing immediately or postponing investment until the next period. Once an 
investment project is in place, the investor is not bound to the project until infinity. 
Rather, there exists an option to abandon the project prematurely. 
Due to the interdependencies of the investment and liquidation decision, even the 
pre-tax model is rather complex. Since integrating taxes substantially increases the 
degree of complexity of the optimal simultaneous investment and abandonment 
decisions, analytical solutions are even more unlikely. To derive the model's main 
economic implications, extensive numerical simulations are necessary. We find that 
varying the liquidation proceeds affects the decision whether or not to postpone the 
investment decision. This result implies that a possible liquidation has to be 
anticipated at the date of investment. However, for a project already in place the date 
of investment does not matter for the liquidation decision. Increasing the pre-tax 
interest rate favors financial investment over real investment. Since delayed real 
investment includes a substantial financial investment component, immediate 
investment suffers more intensively from increased interest rates than delayed 
investment. This result corresponds to traditional investment theory. Higher cash flow 
 
15  This effect is even more obvious in case of capital losses. Then the loss-induced reimbursement 
increases with increasing 
g τ . 
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volatility, measured by the dispersion of upward and downward movements, also 
favors delayed investment. This effect is in line with real option theory: The higher the 
volatility, the higher the value of the option to invest, thus, the lower the propensity to 
exercise the option by investing immediately. 
These general economic effects can be confirmed after the integration of taxes. As a 
first result, integrating taxation complicates the analysis substantially.
16 Moreover, 
our model provides additional insights about the impact of differential taxation of 
interest income, ordinary business income, and capital gains. Compared to the case 
of tax-exempt capital gains, the introduction of capital gains taxation tends to be 
harmful for immediate investment. Since financial investment in our model is 
unaffected by capital gains taxation, the tax burden can only fall on real investment. 
The capital gain for immediate investment exceeds the one for delayed investment. 
Thus, immediate investment is always discriminated more heavily than delayed 
investment. Of course, this effect is largely due to the assumption of constant 
liquidation proceeds, which are unaffected by the date of investment. However, other 
assumptions about the development of the liquidation proceeds over time would be 
either arbitrary or would require very complex asset pricing models that are 
incompatible with the individual calculus considered here. 
Apart from the bias of capital gains taxation against real investment and especially 
immediate real investment, which is a straightforward economic effect, it should be 
noted that taxing capital gains may induce a tax paradox for delayed investment. 
Depending on the pre-tax parameter setting the future value of delayed investment 
may even increase in absolute terms for increasing capital gains tax rates, because 
due to the tax reimbursement at the end of the time horizon the future value from 
continuing the project increases with increasing capital gains tax rate. This effect is 
more likely to occur for low liquidation proceeds. 
The conclusions mentioned above focus on the investment timing decision. This 
decision requires the anticipation of the optimal abandonment decision. If an investor 
decides upon liquidation of a project already in place, capital gains taxation should be 
considered, too. For given liquidation proceeds, which are sufficiently high, capital 
gains taxation tends to favor continuation of a project, because the taxable capital 
gains are higher than if the investor waits until the time horizon. For low liquidation 
proceeds leading to a capital loss, which entitles to a tax reimbursement, the effect is 
vice versa. 
We illustrate the investment and liquidation effects of repealing the current exemption 
of capital gains in some countries and the effects of differential taxation of different 
classes of income. It is not the aim of this paper to provide conclusions about the 
desirability of capital gains taxation, because it is the tax legislator's duty to assess 
                                                 
16 The effect of tax-induced complexity can be observed exemplarily from Hundsdoerfer/ 
Kruschwitz/Lorenz (2008). 
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whether the revealed economic consequences are regarded acceptable. For 
normative statements, a neutral reference case would be needed as a yardstick for 
identifying tax distortions. The reference case in our model is the status quo of tax-
exemption of certain capital gains, not a hypothetical neutral tax. It is evident that 
exemption is not neutral with respect to investment and divestment decisions. 
Distortive effects of capital gains taxes are particularly likely as long as the taxation of 
ordinary income is not neutral. Against the background that real-world tax system 
usually are not neutral we find taxing capital gains would mainly induce other, but not 
necessarily less arbitrary distortions than exempting capital gains. 
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